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Regulation and Innovation: Approaching Market 
Failure from Both Sides 
Yafit Lev-Aretz† & Katherine J. Strandburg†† 
Regulation is often claimed to be the enemy of socially desirable in-
novation because of factors including innovation’s unpredictability and 
regulation’s compliance costs. In this essay, we bring two intellectual 
property scholars’ perspectives to bear on the question of regulation’s 
impact on innovation. We offer a novel, yet intuitive, analytical frame-
work that takes both market demand failures, and failures of supplier ap-
propriability into account. Traditionally, regulation seeks to mitigate 
market failures that create deviations between the demand portfolio per-
ceived by suppliers and the socially optimal demand portfolio. Studies of 
the interplay between regulation and innovation have mostly taken this 
perspective, considering the impact of various regulatory transaction and 
compliance costs on innovation. Intellectual property law and competi-
tion law target a different sort of problem, where markets fail to supply 
products and services at competitive prices or to undertake innovative ac-
tivities because of supplier appropriability issues. 
We argue that these demand-misalignments and appropriability fail-
ures, though analytically distinct and commonly treated separately, work 
in parallel to determine the extent to which the market’s portfolio of in-
novative activity is socially suboptimal. Discussing the relationship be-
tween regulation and innovation in terms of demand misalignment, ap-
propriability failures, and the mutual influence they bear on each other, 
opens up a new way of understanding this long debate. Our analysis 
shows the futility of sweeping generalizations about the relationship be-
tween regulation and innovation and highlights the crucial role of regula-
tory design. 
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I. Introduction 
From pharmaceuticals1 and environmental markets2 to DNA testing3 
and big tech,4 the argument that regulation can “stifle” innovation has a 
long pedigree. Simply put, regulation is said to inhibit innovation by limit-
ing potentially innovative paths and/or increasing innovation costs. As we 
claim in this Essay, however, the current popular debate around the in-
terplay between regulation and innovation has suffered from much over-
simplification. We hope to offer some careful unpacking to understand 
the relationship between regulation and innovation in broader, yet con-
textualized, terms. 
To do this, we must first step back to consider the goals of classical 
regulation on the one hand, and of intellectual property (and to some ex-
tent competition law) on the other hand. The social benefits ascribed to 
competitive markets result from the assumption that consumer demand 
will induce suppliers to produce a socially beneficial portfolio of goods 
and services at competitive prices.5 The same assumptions underlie our 
reliance on markets to induce socially valuable innovation, since invest-
ments in innovation also are premised on perceptions of consumer de-
mand.6 Of course, these assumptions sometimes fail. Through regulation, 
intellectual property law and competition law aim to address such fail-
ures. In this Essay, we explore the interplay between regulation and in-
novation by bringing traditional regulation together with intellectual 
property and competition law. In doing so, we clarify the interplay be-
tween them and add nuance to the currently oversimplified regulation-
innovation debate. 
Specifically, we do so by making an intuitive, yet underexplored, 
conceptual differentiation: regulation addresses misaligned market de-
mand signals on the demand-side, while intellectual property and compe-
tition laws mitigate “failures of appropriability” on the supply-side. Misa-
ligned market demand signals arise, for example, from externalities or 
information asymmetries and are the classic justifications for regulation. 
Traditionally, regulation in areas such as health and safety or environ-
                                               
1 RICHARD ALLEN EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006). 
2 Susse Georg, Regulating the Environment: Changing from Constraint to Gentle Coercion, 3 
BUS. STRATEGY & THE ENV’T, Jan. 1994, at 11-20. 
3 Derek Khanna, Regulations Stifle Innovation, THE HILL (Sept. 15, 2015), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/253625-regulations-stifle-innovation 
[https://perma.cc/JK3E-D7BV]. 
4 Tom Relihan, Will Regulating Big Tech Stifle Innovation?, MIT IDEAS MADE TO MATTER 
(Sept. 27, 2018) https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/will-regulating-big-tech-stifle-
innovation [https://perma.cc/Q3SD-EUSV]. 
5 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What 
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV 1191, 1194 (1977). 
6 See David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE 
PLAN. 172, 176 (2010). 
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mental protection, seek to mitigate misaligned market demands, which 
are understood as deviations between the demand portfolio perceived by 
suppliers and the socially optimal portfolio of demand for goods and ser-
vices.7 Regulation can tackle this problem either by communicating so-
cially preferred demand directly to suppliers or by attempting to realign 
the consumer demand expressed in the market. Either approach can be 
implemented using a menu of regulatory tools that includes mandates, in-
centives, grants, and so forth. 
Unlike regulation that tackles demand-side issues, intellectual prop-
erty law and competition law both target a different sort of problem–one 
of failed supply. Markets sometimes fail to supply products and services 
at competitive prices–or to undertake innovative activities–even when 
suppliers can perfectly perceive consumer demand for them. These fail-
ures, which we term “failures of appropriability,” are due to either free-
rider problems or barriers to entry, which have been the focus of innova-
tion policy and intellectual property doctrine. 
Free-rider problems arise when innovators, who have invested in 
new technologies or other creative outputs, are threatened by the possi-
bility that competitors will “freeride” on their efforts.8 Because competi-
tors can copy, rather than invest in creative activities, they can afford to 
offer lower prices. Innovators are then forced to match those prices, 
which results in them being unable to recoup their creative investments. 
Anticipating this sequence of events, potential innovators will be de-
terred from investing in innovative activities.9 Intellectual property pro-
vides a degree of market exclusivity for a limited period of time to ad-
dress potential “freeriding” by competitors.10  
While intellectual property is designed to address potentially higher 
costs of entry for first entrants, competition law attempts to deal with the 
opposite concern: higher costs of entry for later entrants. Barriers to en-
try deter latecomers from competing and capitalizing on follow-on inno-
                                               
7 The term “regulation” has both broad and narrow usages. The broad approach groups together 
all statutory interventions that interfere with or limit market players’ behaviors. Some have de-
bated, for example, whether intellectual property should be deemed “regulation” or “property.” 
The narrow approach looks at regulation as addressing failures in market demand. Here we use 
“regulation” in this narrow sense, which we believe encompasses its most commonly understood 
meaning. Of course, regulations can be designed in many ways, some of which are sometimes 
called “demand-side” regulations, because they attempt to shift consumer demand, and others 
are sometimes called “supply-side” regulations because they target suppliers. Our definition fo-
cuses on the source of the problem in scenarios where there is socially sub-optimal perceived 
demand. As such, the definition is agnostic towards the best approach to regulatory design, 
which we presume will depend on the specifics of any given scenario. 
8 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1246 (1968) (referring 
to the “free-rider problem” as “the tragedy of the commons”). 
9 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 279 (1991). 
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 927 
(2001) (“Without legal protection, the creator of intellectual property may be unable to recoup 
his investment, because competitors can free ride on it.”).  
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vation in a market dominated by incumbents.11 Barriers to entry in this 
context refer to structural economic disadvantages faced by some en-
trants but not others.12 Competition law aims to address barriers to entry 
of this sort because they are associated with anti-competitive behavior 
and monopolization.13 
Our claim is that regulation and intellectual property/competition 
law, though analytically distinct and commonly treated separately, work 
in parallel and in combination to determine the extent to which the mar-
ket’s portfolio of innovative activity is socially sub-optimal. Despite this 
interplay, the regulatory literature, including the literature on regulation 
and innovation, has paid little attention to “failures of appropriability,”14 
effectively assuming that intellectual property law operates independent-
ly to resolve them.15 We offer a novel paradigm from two intellectual 
property scholars’ perspective to bear on the question of regulation’s im-
pact on innovation. Discussing the relationship between regulation and 
innovation in terms of demand misalignment, appropriability failures, 
and the mutual influence they bear on each other, opens up a new way of 
understanding this long debate.  
We begin, in Part II, by framing the controversy as presented in the 
regulation-innovation debate and highlighting weaknesses in current ap-
proaches. In Part III, we outline the roles of (i) traditional regulation and 
(ii) intellectual property and competition law in terms of the market fail-
ures they are designed to address. In Part IV we consider the effects of 
regulation on realigned demand, both directly and in terms of overall re-
duction in innovation. Finally, in Part V, we bring everything together by 
looking at the mutual influence of regulation and innovation policy on 
each other from the perspective of misaligned demand signals and appro-
priability failures. We close with a conclusion. 
                                               
11 See generally David L. White, Shaping Antitrust Enforcement: Greater Emphasis on Barriers 
to Entry, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 823, 823 (1989). 
12 See, e.g., R. S. Khemani & D. M. Shapiro, Barriers to Entry, OECD GLOSSARY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 13-14 (1990), 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8AL-ST7Y]. 
13 Interestingly, the free-rider problem can also be viewed through a barrier-to-entry lens. The 
free-rider problem occurs because first entrants face higher costs than later entrants. This sort of 
barrier to first entry is essentially the reverse of the standard barrier to later entry. Both sorts of 
barriers to entry tip the playing field away from a competitive market in which all potential en-
trants face similar costs and entry conditions. One advantage of conceptualizing intellectual 
property law and competition law as responding to tilts in directions away from a level playing 
field is that it becomes easier to see how free-riding concerns can be canceled out–and even 
overcorrected for–by barriers to entry for follow-up innovators. 
14 The converse is also true. The IP and innovation policy literature mostly ignores the possibility 
that market demand for innovative activity might be misaligned with social welfare except in 
discussions of technology transfer and the relationship between IP and government-funded sci-
ence. 
15 Puzzlingly, the existing literature on the interplay between regulation and innovation is largely 
lacking in contributions from intellectual property scholars.  
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II. Framing the Regulation-Innovation Debate 
The contention that regulation will stifle innovation is hardly new; it 
is a trope that surfaces regularly in response to proposals to regulate 
technology and has provoked a longstanding and politically contentious 
policy debate. The academic literature on the interplay between regula-
tion and innovation focuses primarily on a few topics, most notably envi-
ronmental regulation.16 Much of this literature is empirical and the out-
comes depend to some extent on the methodologies and metrics for 
innovation that are used. The majority view, to the extent that one exists, 
is that the net impact of regulation on innovation depends largely on reg-
ulatory design, with commentators suggesting a variety of design factors 
that are likely to affect the outcome.17 
For example, one of the most extensive strands of empirical litera-
ture addressing the relationship between innovation and regulation fo-
cuses on the well-known Porter Hypothesis, which claims that “if proper-
ly designed, environmental regulations can lead to ‘innovation offsets’ 
that will not only improve environmental performance, but also partial-
ly—and sometimes more than fully—offset the additional cost of regula-
tion.”18 Commentators have described the Porter Hypothesis as having 
strong and weak forms. The weak form asserts that regulation often trig-
gers innovation, especially through means of compliance,19 while the 
strong version asserts that the benefits that accrue to firms from this in-
novation often offset the costs they bear from regulation.20 A recent re-
view of empirical studies found consistent support for the weak version–
namely that firms respond to regulation by innovating–but less clarity 
about the strong version.21 While older studies tended to push against the 
strong version, several more recent studies–some of which took account 
of dynamic effects and changing market conditions–favored it.22 Im-
                                               
16 E.g., INNOVATION-ORIENTED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Jens Hemmelskamp, Klaus Rennings & Fabio Leone eds., 2000); 
Adam B. Jaffe & Karen Palmer, Environmental Regulation and Innovation: A Panel Data 
Study, 79 REV. ECON. & STAT. 610 (1997); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects of Environmental 
Regulation on Innovation, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (1979). 
17 See, e.g., Luke A. Stewart, INST. MED. COMM. ON PATIENT SAFETY & HEALTH IT, THE 
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A CROSS-INDUSTRY 
LITERATURE REVIEW, 7-8, 21-23 (2010); Stefan Ambec et al., The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can 
Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?, 7 REV. ENVTL. ECON. 
AND POL'Y 1, 8-10 (2013). 
18 Ambec et al., supra note 17, at 3-4; see also Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward 
a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 
(1995).  
19 In other words, regulation motivates innovation when businesses and individuals attempt to 
make compliance feasible, more efficient, and/or less costly.  
20 Ambec et al., supra note 17, at 5. 
21 Ambec et al., supra note 17, at 9-10. 
22 See, e.g., Jung-Ah Hwang & Yeonbae Kim, Effects of Environmental Regulations on Trade 
Flow in Manufacturing Sectors: Comparison of Static and Dynamic Effects of Environmental 
Regulations, 26 BUS. STRATEGY & THE ENV’T 688, 699 (2017); Paul Lanoie, Michel Patry & 
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portantly, the Porter Hypothesis and its tests do not address the net social 
welfare effects of regulation. Where the strong version of the Porter Hy-
pothesis holds, it is plausible that the regulation is socially beneficial 
overall (though one could imagine counterexamples). Even if the strong 
version does not hold, however, a regulation may be justified from a so-
cial perspective by creating social benefits to more than offset the com-
pliance costs to firms.23 
One novel theoretical framework for analyzing the interplay be-
tween regulation and innovation builds on Richard Stewart’s seminal ar-
ticle from 1981.24 Stewart’s framework draws a distinction between “mar-
ket innovation” and “social innovation.” The article defines “market 
innovation” in terms of “new products and processes” that “increase 
productivity as measured by traditional national income accounting” or 
“create benefits that firms can capture through the sale of goods and ser-
vices in the market.”25 “Social innovation” is defined as “product or pro-
cess innovations that create social benefits, such as cleaner air, that firms 
cannot directly capture through market sales.”26 Stewart argues that regu-
lations may adversely affect “market innovation” by imposing technical 
constraints, forcing firms to make expenditures to comply, creating ex 
ante uncertainty as to whether innovations will meet regulatory require-
ments, and introducing delay associated with determining whether new 
products and processes meet such requirements.27 He argues that “gov-
ernment, rather than the market, ordinarily must provide incentives for 
regulated firms to undertake investment necessary to generate social in-
novation” and critiques command-and-control approaches to regulation 
for failing to successfully incentivize social innovation.28 Stewart’s market-
social innovation framework has been adopted by a number of later 
scholars.29 
Though Stewart’s distinction between “market innovation” and “so-
cial innovation” highlights important aspects of the relationship between 
innovation and regulation, we think that attempts to actually categorize 
innovations within this framework or to judge a regulatory scheme in 
                                                                                                             
Richard Lajeunesse, Environmental Regulation and Productivity: Testing the Porter Hypothesis, 
30 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 121, 128 (2008). 
23 Innovations that reduce the costs of compliance are generally socially beneficial once a regula-
tion is in place. Of course, it is always possible that a regulation is badly designed, so that the 
costs of even the most efficient forms of compliance outweigh its benefits. Compliance with well-
designed regulation is socially beneficial, however, even if it creates new costs, because the regu-
lation addresses market failures that are also associated with social costs. As long as the regula-
tion is well-designed, innovations that reduce compliance costs are also socially beneficial.  
24 Richard Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 
69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256 (1981). 
25 Id. at 1261.  
26 Id. at 1279.  
27 Id. at 1281. 
28 Id.  
29 See, e.g., Tal Z. Zarsky, The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 115, 
126 (2015). 
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terms of its production of “social innovation” will be confusing and po-
tentially misleading. As Stewart explicitly recognized, “[a] given innova-
tion may confer both market and social benefits.”30 This point tends to 
fall by the wayside in later analyses, but it is crucial because nearly every 
innovation produced by market actors will have both “market” and “so-
cial” benefits.  
Barring complete government subsidy, we cannot expect firms–who 
are creatures of the market, after all–to undertake any innovative activity 
unless they anticipate at least some market benefits. Thus, firms will nev-
er engage in purely “social” innovation. To induce firms to engage in this 
sort of innovation, a regulation must somehow create capturable benefits, 
thus transforming the innovation, at least in part, into a market innova-
tion. On the flip side, while some purely market innovations may exist, 
the standard understanding is that innovation, by its very nature, is likely 
to create positive externalities or “spillovers.”31 And while intellectual 
property aims to allow innovators to capture enough returns to cover 
their costs, intellectual property rights are capped so that downstream in-
novators (and society) can benefit from any remaining spillovers. The 
bottom line is that the vast majority of innovations produced by firms will 
create some benefits captured by firms and some benefits that spill over 
to society. Classifying them as either “market innovations” or “social in-
novations” is either impossible or meaningless.  
Beyond this, the classification of innovations as “social” because 
they “create social benefits, such as cleaner air, that firms cannot directly 
capture through market sales” is inadequate if regulation is to be judged 
by how much it induces “social innovation” without suppressing “market 
innovation.” The definition is problematic for several reasons. For one, 
producing “social innovation” is not the only defensible justification for 
regulation. Stewart’s article describes the “basic justification for envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regulation” as “preventing or reducing 
harmful spillovers or externalities such as pollution generated by produc-
ers and consumers in a market economy,” while “social innovation” is es-
sentially defined as innovation that reduces this sort of externality.32  
Regulations might be justified by other sorts of market failures, es-
pecially outside of the environmental arena. Collective action problems 
can hinder the achievement of positive social goals even when there are 
no negative externalities to counteract. Perhaps more controversially, in 
                                               
30 Id. at 1279. 
31 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 
(2007); Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 
WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 389-90 (2017). (“Economic analysts agree that, for innovations that could 
exacerbate or mitigate a social harm, there are two potential reasons for government interven-
tion. First, since society benefits from innovation to a greater extent than innovators themselves 
capture (partly because not all ideas can be patented), innovators produce positive “externali-
ties” for society.”). 
32 Stewart, supra note 24, at 1263. 
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the context of privacy regulation, regulations often aim to correct market 
failures that are not naturally characterized in terms of externalities of 
any sort. Consumer protection regulations are often designed to counter-
act information asymmetries and other problems that lead consumers to 
purchase goods and services that do not align with their actual prefer-
ences. A broader understanding of the sorts of innovation that regulation 
should induce is required. 
Moreover, the goals of regulation can sometimes be met without any 
sort of social innovation. Some sorts of innovation may be suppressed be-
cause of their negative externalities and/or other market failures. As 
Stewart’s framework suggests, regulations often are designed to deal with 
negative externalities produced by market innovations. While it is cer-
tainly a societal bonus if such regulations also incentivize innovations that 
generate positive externalities, surely such socially positive innovations 
are not requirements for socially beneficial regulation. We will judge such 
a regulation primarily in terms of the way that it picks and chooses among 
market innovations. A possible example from recent news reports is the 
3D-printable handgun. We might decide as a society to use regulation to 
discourage innovations developed to improve the production of 3D-
printable handguns. If we agreed on this goal, what would we consider in 
evaluating a specific proposal’s effects on innovation? We might be con-
cerned about collateral suppression of socially beneficial 3D-printing in-
novations or socially beneficial innovations in gun design. But the regula-
tion would be unlikely to fail simply because it achieved its goal by 
suppressing the market innovation associated with 3D-printable gun pro-
duction or because it failed to produce any additional social innovation.  
Finally, the definition of social innovation in terms of benefits that 
firms cannot capture through market sales blurs the distinction between 
market failures that result from faulty demand signals, and those that re-
sult from “failures of appropriability” due to competition among suppli-
ers. The collective action problem that keeps citizens from pooling their 
money to pay for the installation of technology to improve air quality 
creates a misalignment between market demand signals and citizens’ true 
preferences. Intellectual property law deals with an entirely different sort 
of market failure, one caused by a supplier’s fear that his/her investments 
in developing such a technology will be undercut by market competitors 
who are spared the upfront investment.33 
                                               
33 This distinction might seem artificial, but it is not; this is the case because markets solve a 
number of different informational and coordination problems, which include not only “what do 
consumers want?” but also “who will supply it?” The second question is particularly important 
for innovation, since it is difficult to predict in advance who will do the best job. There are, of 
course, non-market mechanisms for handling this issue (for example, peer-reviewed grant fund-
ing), but one reason for relying on intellectual property is that inventors identify themselves 
through their activities and are rewarded after the fact. Thus, while overcoming the demand-side 
collective action problem to collect the funds needed to pay for the clean air technology allows 
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In the next Part, we present a framework for analyzing the interplay 
between regulation and innovation that takes a different approach. Ra-
ther than attempt to categorize innovations, we will focus on how the 
market failures associated with misaligned demand signals and “failures 
of appropriability” affect the market’s ability to induce socially beneficial 
innovation. 
III. When Demand and Supply Fail 
The argument that regulation can “stifle” innovation is often made 
generically, with little analysis and in a contextual vacuum. To analyze 
whether and when to take it seriously, we start by unpacking what it 
might mean. We step back to consider the economic issues underlying 
theories of regulation as well as intellectual property and competition 
law.  
The portfolio of innovative activity induced by the market reflects 
the combined effects of two distinct forces, (i) the market demand signals 
perceived by potential innovators and (ii) the extent to which those sup-
pliers expect to be able to appropriate market returns from particular in-
novative activities.34 We can describe these forces loosely as “what con-
sumers are willing to pay” and “what suppliers are able to charge.” If 
either of these forces is misaligned, markets will fail to produce socially 
optimal portfolios of innovative activity. Regulatory policy traditionally 
focuses on market failures that occur when market demand signals are 
misaligned with individual or social preferences, while intellectual prop-
erty doctrine focuses on what we call “failures of appropriability,” where-
in suppliers are able to charge either too much or too little to induce op-
timal investment in innovation.35 
A. Misaligned Market Demand Signals 
Reasons for misalignment between market demand signals and so-
cial welfare fall into three categories: (i) externalities and related collec-
tive action problems, (ii) failures to accurately express individual prefer-
ences because of information asymmetries, irrational behaviors, and/or 
                                                                                                             
consumers to signal their demand, it does not tell them who should get the money. Relying on 
the competitive market to answer that question brings appropriability questions into play. 
34 There are, of course, other factors that influence the market’s portfolio of innovative activities, 
perhaps most importantly the “state-of-the-art” for a given technology, which affects the cost of 
innovation. Neither regulation nor intellectual property affects these costs in the short run. In 
the long run, as recently explored by Liscow and Karpilow, supra note 31, there may be consid-
erable path dependence, given that the spillovers of innovation tend to be most helpful in closely 
related innovation. This path dependence suggests an additional reason for attempting to align 
innovation incentives with social benefit. 
35 We also acknowledge that there are various definitions of “demand failure,” “demand-side 
regulation,” “supply-side failure,” and “supply-side regulation,” in the regulatory literatures. We 
have no quarrel with those usages, but for our purposes, we find it useful to parse things differ-
ently. We attempt to define our terms explicitly here to avoid confusion with these other usages. 
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transaction costs, and (iii) misalignment with social values such as distrib-
utive justice, treatment of minorities, and ethical norms.36 We describe 
each of these categories in more detail below. Here, we take a broad view 
of market failures and a correspondingly broad view of justifications for 
regulation. Our general arguments do not rely on that broad approach, 
however, but require only two minimal assumptions. First, we assume 
that market demand signals can fail due to a misalignment between (i) 
true individual and social preferences and (ii) the demand expressed in 
market transactions. Second, we assume that government regulation can 
be designed and enacted to mitigate such misalignments. In other words, 
government regulation is not so hopelessly infected with public choice 
problems that the cure is inevitably worse than the disease. Normative 
and empirical debates about particular justifications for regulation would, 
of course, enter into the detailed contextual analysis that is required to 
evaluate particular regulatory proposals in light of our analysis. Our 
broad view of the demand problems that can justify regulation is contest-
able and becomes more controversial as one goes down the list. 
1. Externalities and Related Collective Action Problems 
Classically, market demand may fail to reflect social preferences be-
cause of externalities or collective action problems. These are related, but 
distinct issues. Externalities arise when those who are not party to an 
economic transaction are affected by it, either negatively or positively. 
Regulatory policy focuses on externalities that affect individual consum-
ers. Environmental regulations, for example, classically address negative 
externality issues, such as when those living in the vicinity of a manufac-
turing plant are harmed by pollution but have no market channel for ex-
pressing their preferences because they are not customers of the plant. 
When negative externalities are large enough, the market will induce so-
cially undesirable innovations that generate net revenue to businesses be-
cause neither they nor their customers internalize the social costs. Con-
versely, if positive externalities are large enough, the willingness to pay 
expressed in the market might be insufficient to induce socially desirable 
innovations. 
In principle, consumers affected by externalities might be able to 
overcome them by cooperating to pay suppliers to take them into ac-
count. For example, the neighbors of a polluting factory could pay the 
factory to install air filters. Regulation commonly targets situations in 
which such cooperation does not occur or is very wasteful due to high 
transaction costs, consumer lack of information, strategic behavior (by 
either consumers or businesses), and so forth. Collective action problems 
are particularly likely to prevent effective responses to externalities be-
                                               
36 These categories are neither entirely distinct nor comprehensive. They are simply illustrative. 
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cause the affected individuals are ordinarily strangers to one another and 
to the business creating the externality. When negative externalities af-
fect public goods, such as air quality, collective action problems are 
heightened by strategic dilemmas, because each individual has an incen-
tive to wait for others to expend the effort required to solve the problem. 
2. Distortions of Individual Preferences 
Consumer purchasing behavior may also fail to reflect actual indi-
vidual preferences, thus distorting the demand signals the market sends 
to suppliers. Reasons for such distortion include lack of information, cog-
nitive biases, consumer myopia, and even the declining marginal value of 
money. Health and safety regulations often respond to this sort of failure. 
Similarly, consumer protection regulations are often justified in terms of 
consumers’ lack of information and expertise needed to assess the quality 
of products and services or to evaluate the transaction terms. For exam-
ple, regulations mandating labeling address this sort of issue, as do certifi-
cations or licensing requirements, cooling-off periods, and many more. 
Collective action problems can also arise in circumstances that do 
not involve externalities. They may arise whenever cooperation could re-
duce the transaction costs or information asymmetries associated with in-
dividual transactions. Essentially, this can be the case when the measures 
needed to contend with these problems are at least partially non-
rivalrous. In such cases, the issue does not concern externalities since in-
dividuals are not directly affected by other parties’ transactions. Instead, 
the issue is whether the costs can be reduced by spreading them to the 
collective. In essence, the idea is to kill two transaction cost birds with 
one stone.37 If there is sufficient non-rivalry, cooperation could reduce 
transaction costs for each consumer enough to allow her to pursue her 
individual interests. Class action litigation is designed to overcome this 
sort of collective action problem, by allowing consumers to avoid duplica-
tive costs associated with litigation. 
3. Misalignment with Social and Ethical Values 
Finally, market demand signals might fail to account for important 
social values such as distributive justice, minority rights, and ethical 
norms. There are various reasons why markets might fail to account for 
such values. For one, these values often concern systemic effects that are 
not visible to individuals when they are transacting. If individuals cannot 
evaluate the systemic impact of their transactions, their market behaviors 
                                               
37 What is required is some degree of non-rivalry associated with the transaction costs. For ex-
ample, certain pieces of information might be useful for many individuals in their discrete trans-
actions with a supplier, even if the information must be deployed separately in each transaction 
and each individual cares only about the outcome of his/her own transaction. 
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cannot express the value they place on those effects. For example, an in-
dividual consumer who values economic equality highly will find it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to assess the distributive effects of her individual 
market transactions. The expression of such systemic values is also rife 
with collective action problems. Apart from these issues, most citizens of 
constitutional democracies would presumably agree that some questions 
are appropriately decided by majority vote, rather than by market trans-
actions, and that some rights are not defeasible even by majority vote. A 
free market for human body parts is illustrative. Trading human body 
parts has widely been deemed so morally unacceptable and likely to pro-
duce negative systemic effects that democracies have generally opted to 
prohibit it, despite the existence of market demand and contrarian views 
about its moral and systemic implications. These are the sorts of values 
we have in mind in this category of justifications for regulation. 
B. “Failures of Appropriability”: What Suppliers Can Charge 
Realigning demand signals with social preferences is only one side of 
the story. Markets may fail to deliver the portfolio of goods and services 
that society demands if suppliers’ ability to appropriate market returns 
varies significantly among goods and services. In such a situation, suppli-
ers will shift production toward goods and services with relatively high 
appropriability, thus distorting the market’s portfolio of goods and ser-
vices, even if demand signals are perfectly aligned with individual and so-
cial preferences. As a general rule, markets rely on competition to keep 
the appropriability landscape level. That being said, innovators can run 
into appropriability problems even in competitive markets. 
1. Free Riding and Intellectual Property Protection 
Appropriability failures, in the form of free-rider problems, are the 
quintessential justification for intellectual property. Free-rider problems 
arise because innovators often make upfront investments that competi-
tors can avoid by copying. To recoup his/her investment through market 
return, an innovator needs to charge supra-competitive prices (at least for 
a while). If competitors can cheaply copy the innovation, however, they 
can afford to charge competitive prices, thereby freeriding on the innova-
tor’s investment. To compete, innovators will be forced to lower their 
prices to a competitive level, but they may then be unable to recoup their 
creative investments. Anticipating this free-rider problem, potential in-
novators may be deterred from investing in innovative activities altogeth-
er. When that occurs, the market’s portfolio of goods and services is dis-
torted away from innovative activity, even when there is demand for it.  
Intellectual property law responds to the free-rider problem by 
awarding exclusive rights to innovators, allowing them to charge supra-
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competitive prices during the term of intellectual property protection.38 
By charging supra-competitive prices, innovators can recoup their up-
front investments. Moreover, since they can expect intellectual property 
protection, they will no longer be deterred from innovation that responds 
to consumer demand. If all goes well, intellectual property protection will 
level out the appropriability landscape. However, intellectual property 
exclusivity can create two sorts of social costs. First, it can overcompen-
sate (or undercompensate) innovators if the length and breadth of the ex-
clusive rights are not tailored to the innovator’s upfront investment.39 
Second, exclusivity is a socially costly way to “reimburse” innovators,40 
because it restricts the innovative activities of follow-on innovators in a 
way that a simple repayment would not.  
Recognizing these dangers, intellectual property doctrine is de-
signed–at least in its aspirations–to avoid awarding unnecessary exclusivi-
ty. Patent law’s non-obviousness requirement, for example, disqualifies 
trivial inventions from patent protection. It attempts to limit the awarding 
of patents only to cases where the natural advantages first movers enjoy 
when entering a new market would not be sufficient to cover the costs as-
sociated with the innovation, such as research and development (R&D) 
costs.41 Patent law’s disclosure requirements, under which a patent appli-
cation must disclose the invention in sufficient detail for an individual 
skilled in the art to carry out that invention, strike a balance between 
awarding current innovators and incentivizing follow-on innovators.42 
Copyright’s fair use doctrine, which protects unauthorized copying of 
copyrighted works for a limited and “transformative” purpose, similarly 
limits the effects of exclusivity on downstream creativity.43 Trade secrecy 
exclusivity is limited by permitting reverse engineering and independent 
invention.44  
                                               
38 See Posner, supra note 10, at 926. 
39 It is commonly said that intellectual property’s supra-competitive prices impose socially costly 
deadweight losses even if they are tailored to the innovator’s upfront cost. However, someone 
presumably has to pay the costs of an innovation. Consumers seem to be the natural choice 
(though perhaps not only those who buy during the IP term). In any event, we are focusing on 
overly broad intellectual property exclusivity, which is undoubtedly socially costly.  
40 Assuming that a competitive market, rather than a monopoly, is the best driver of innovation. 
41 The non-obviousness requirement mandates that an invention must be sufficiently different 
from the previous innovation landscape (“prior art”) such that “a person having ordinary skill in 
the art to which the claimed invention pertains” would not deem it to be obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 
103 (2012) (“A patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed inven-
tion and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art to which the claimed invention pertains.”) (emphasis added). 
42 Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 PITT. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (2012) (defending patent dis-
closure requirements by noting that peripheral disclosure allows patents to disseminate their in-
formation in areas other than the patent document). 
43 Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1384 (2015). 
44 Joseph P. Fishman, The Copy Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 856 (2016). 
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For the purposes of our discussion, we can characterize intellectual 
property doctrine as a mechanism for redressing certain “failures of ap-
propriability” common to innovative activity. In a perfectly competitive 
market, the appropriability landscape is flat in the following sense: all 
competitors producing a given product or service face the same produc-
tion costs, and prices will be set to cover those costs–assuming there is 
sufficient consumer demand.45 Thus, in a perfectly competitive market, 
the portfolio of goods and services produced by the market is determined 
only by the way that consumer demand relates to production costs. With-
out intellectual property, however, potential innovators do not see such a 
flat appropriability landscape because freeriding competitors can set 
prices too low to cover the innovator’s R&D investments. Unless first 
mover advantages or other non-market rewards are sufficient to cover 
R&D investments, innovations inhabit troughs of under-compensation in 
the appropriability landscape. Even when consumer demand is sufficient 
to cover R&D costs, innovators will be unable to appropriate sufficient 
returns to cover them. 
Intellectual property doctrine is designed to fill in those troughs 
through limited grants of market exclusivity, avoiding both over and un-
der-compensation to even out the landscape so that market production 
will reflect consumer demand. The intellectual property solution, howev-
er, has at least two important limitations, (i) intellectual property awards 
can over or under-compensate innovators for their R&D investments, 
and (ii) intellectual property is concentrated in fighting only one sort of 
appropriability failure: freeriding by competitors. 
Intellectual property doctrine reflects an assumption that “failures of 
appropriability” affect wide swaths of goods and services in roughly the 
same way. It is thus designed to be neutral–for the most part–across its 
areas of applicability.46 Doctrines such as patent law’s “person having or-
dinary skill in the art,”47 introduce some variability, but serve mostly as 
ways to (i) determine whether intellectual property exclusivity is neces-
sary or (ii) tailor the protection’s scope to the innovator’s contribution. 
As a result, the exclusivity returns associated with intellectual property 
                                               
45 In the simplest model, price will be set at marginal cost. In the real world, production of goods 
and services also requires some fixed investments, which must be covered by revenues. These 
fixed investments ordinarily do not cause appropriability failures because they are roughly the 
same for all competitors.  
46 This is especially true of patent law, which applies nominally the same doctrinal rules to all 
technological arenas. Copyright recognizes more special cases, but nonetheless the basic rules 
governing scope and limitations apply to all types of “expression.” 
47 USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.03 (9th ed. 2018) (explaining 
“a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the inven-
tion. Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art may in-
clude: (1) ‘type of problems encountered in the art;’ (2) ‘prior art solutions to those problems;’ 
(3) ‘rapidity with which innovations are made;’ (4) ‘sophistication of the technology; and’ (5) 
‘educational level of active workers in the field . . . . In a given case, every factor may not be pre-
sent, and one or more factors may predominate.’”). 
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awards are only roughly in line with R&D investments. Because tailoring 
intellectual property awards precisely to R&D investments would be im-
practical and prohibitively costly, intellectual property doctrine repre-
sents a balance between the costs and benefits of such tailoring. This 
means that while intellectual property fills in the large troughs created by 
freeriding, the appropriability landscape inevitably remains somewhat 
rough, scattered with hillocks of over-compensation and hollows of un-
der-compensation. Market innovators respond to the combination of de-
mand signals and appropriability. A given demand portfolio highlights a 
particular landscape of hillocks and hollows. Regulation shifts the de-
mand portfolio, highlighting different parts of the landscape with differ-
ent distributions of hillocks and hollows. If intellectual property doctrine 
is well-designed, however, the hillocks and hollows it creates are reason-
ably small and relatively uniform. 
Another one of intellectual property doctrine’s aims is to roughly 
equalize appropriability along different innovative paths so that market 
demand and innovator ingenuity–rather than rent-seeking–determine the 
innovations that the market induces. Exclusive rights in intellectual prop-
erty are designed to mitigate a particular set of “failures of appropriabil-
ity,” namely freeriding by competitors. However, in some contexts, inno-
vators also face the risk of freeriding by consumers. The most important 
such context is broadcast media. Consumers free ride when they can take 
advantage of an innovation without paying for it because practicalities 
make it difficult or impossible for producers to identify users and demand 
payment.48 Television and radio confronted just this problem, since it was 
essentially impossible to monitor and demand payment for consumption 
of content once it was broadcast into the ether.49 Even though copyright 
and patent rights apply to consumers in principle, intellectual property is 
often unenforceable against them.50 Not only would intellectual property 
enforcement often be difficult and expensive, but lawsuits targeted at 
personal uses and noncommercial infringements have proven only mildly 
successful, while tremendously damaging for businesses’ reputations.51 
The market-based solution that developed to address this type of supply-
side problem in the broadcast context was advertising-supported media. 
Advertisers were willing to pay in proportion to the crowd of “eyeballs” 
                                               
48 This problem obviously affects not only the ability to recoup upfront creative investments, but 
the ability to collect revenues for more mundane operating costs. 
49 See Harry P. Warner, Unfair Competition and the Protection of Radio and Television Pro-
grams I, 1950 WASH. U. L. Q. 297 (1950). 
50 See, e.g., John Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforce-
ment in the Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 59 (2003) (“However, even if the Dutch court 
rules against KaZaa, enforcement of its ruling will be difficult. Modern purveyors of piracy are 
either internationally dispersed individuals operating on a decentralized P2P system, such as 
Gnutella, or they are nimble shell corporations that can easily relocate their systems and opera-
tions to a venue with favorable laws.”). 
51 See William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 496 (2011). 
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the broadcast attracted, thus providing an income stream that was rough-
ly correlated with consumer demand for particular programming.52 In this 
sense, advertising income serves as a form of underwriting for creative 
investment, mitigating a failure of appropriability caused by consumer 
freeriding.53  
2. Barriers to Entry and Competition Law 
The market’s portfolio of innovative activity might also be distorted 
by other sources of appropriability failures that are more contextual and 
less related to innovation per se. Barriers to entry are one such source of 
appropriability failure. Barriers to entry favor early entrants by imposing 
higher upfront costs on later market entrants. Here, we focus on natural 
barriers to entry, rather than those created by anticompetitive behavior, 
which we leave to antitrust law.54 One important mechanism for creating 
natural barriers to entry is the network effect, whereby a product or ser-
vice’s value to each consumer depends not only on its quality, but also on 
the number of other consumers using it.55 Think, for example, of a tele-
phone network, or, for a more current example, of a social media plat-
form such as Facebook. The more users there are on the network, the 
more valuable the product is to each user and the harder it is for later en-
trants to offer attractive alternatives. 
For our purposes, barriers to entry are significant because they are 
an additional source of appropriability failure. The prospect of benefit-
ting from natural barriers to entry can create hills–or even mountains–in 
the appropriability landscape, making particular sorts of innovative activ-
ity overly attractive to suppliers. The need to compete with an incumbent 
who currently benefits from barriers to entry creates troughs in the ap-
propriability landscape that make competitive follow-on innovation less 
                                               
52 See Blaine Bassett, The Inevitable Television Revolution: The Technology Is Ready, The 
Business Is Lagging, and the Law Can Help, 29 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 30 (2013). 
53 Today, advertising’s importance as a mechanism for addressing consumer freeriding has sub-
stantially diminished since the emergence of cable and online content delivery mechanisms that 
can be metered. In the meantime, however, the advertising-based business model combined with 
data-intensive ad targeting, has taken on a new life that is relatively detached from its origins as 
a solution to consumer freeriding. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online 
Market's Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013).  
54 There is an ongoing debate about the goals and proper role of antitrust law, which we do not 
attempt to engage here. See JONATHAN GALLOWAY ET AL., MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 20–21 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the aims of competition law); see, e.g., Philip C. 
Kissam, Symposium: Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1984) (discussing 
two primary purposes of antitrust law, one of which is to “preserv[e] opportunities for small 
businesses”). We also take no position on the question of how antitrust law should respond (if at 
all) to natural barriers to entry. 
55 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 483–84 (1998) (defining “network effect”). 
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attractive, much like raising upfront costs or raising the quality bar.56 In 
some circumstances, antitrust law is needed to reduce barriers to entry. 
When that is the case, these appropriability distortions will be modified 
and hopefully reduced. 
From the perspective of a prospective innovator looking out over the 
appropriability landscape, it is the combination of these effects that mat-
ters. While expected consumer demand is a prerequisite for market-
induced innovation, the attractiveness of a given innovation path depends 
on a variety of factors. Such factors include whether an innovator expects 
to be able to recoup his/her investments using intellectual property, 
whether she anticipates taking advantage of barriers to entry, and wheth-
er she needs to factor in the costs of overcoming such barriers. Appropri-
ability expectations for a given innovative activity can exhibit offsetting 
effects. The innovator may be at a disadvantage with respect to later en-
trants because of freeriding, while at the same time benefitting from an-
ticipated barriers to later entry, such as network effects. Appropriability 
failures can also be compounded if overprotective intellectual property 
laws combine with the benefits associated with barriers to entry. 
Rather than offering insights on how best to design intellectual 
property law and competition law to deal with appropriability failures, 
our focus in this Essay is on the interaction between regulation and inno-
vation. We therefore take those areas of doctrine as given and explain 
how regulation’s realignment of demand combines with the appropriabil-
ity landscape to change the market’s portfolio of innovative activities. 
IV. Regulation and Innovation: Effects of Re-Aligned Demand 
We break our consideration of the likely effects of regulation on in-
novation and the extent to which regulation is likely to “stifle” innovation 
into two parts. In Section IV.A, we consider the direct effects of regula-
tion’s re-alignment of demand signals. In Section IV.B we consider regu-
lation’s potential effects on innovation through its interactions with ap-
propriability failures.  
A. Direct Effects of Re-Aligned Demand 
The goal of regulation is to realign the market’s portfolio of demand 
along more socially desirable lines. Because the market’s innovative ac-
tivity is responsive to market demand, one obvious result of regulation is 
likely to be a shift in the market’s portfolio of innovative activity. A well-
designed regulation–one that shifts perceived demand closer to social 
preferences and at a cost that does not outweigh the benefits of that re-
                                               
56 See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpa-
tentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1769 (2000) (explaining how patent law can raise 
the bar for follow-on innovators). 
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alignment–is highly likely to reduce perceived demand for some sorts of 
innovative activity and increase demand for others.57  
1. Regulation and Effects on the Distribution of Innovation 
In a well-functioning market, these changes in demand would drive 
changes in the direction of innovative activities. Indeed, motivating inno-
vation in socially promising directions is a primary purpose of various 
regulatory programs, including certain types of tax deductions and tax 
credits.58 For example, CAFÉ regulations decrease demand for innova-
tions in gas-guzzling vehicles while increasing demand for innovations in 
energy-efficient automotive technology.59 Regulations capping emissions 
from coal plants reduce effective demand for innovations relating to high-
emission plants, while increasing effective demand for low-emission tech-
nology. 
These effects on the distribution of innovative activity are likely to 
create winners and losers. While losers may complain that the regulation 
“stifles” innovation, such intended shifts are not “stifling” in any socially 
meaningful sense. The mere fact that a regulation dampens some innova-
tive activities is not evidence that it is “stifling” innovation–indeed, it may 
indicate that the regulation is working. 
As the Porter Hypothesis suggests for environmental regulation, it is 
entirely possible that by shifting innovative activity to more socially bene-
ficial paths, regulation may stimulate innovation and thus economic 
growth over the long term.60 As already mentioned, the Porter Hypothe-
sis remains controversial but has received considerable empirical sup-
port.61 Indeed, its “weak” form, which simply argues that regulation can 
                                               
57 Suzanne Scotchmer, Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation, 11 INNOVATION POL'Y 
& ECON. 29, 49 (2011) (concluding that “[a]ny regulatory policy that imposes financial burdens 
for emitting carbon also creates an incentive to invest in carbon-reducing technologies”). 
58 See Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 
25, 34-35 (2017) (giving a brief background on the use of taxes to encourage innovation).  
59 Joseph M. Crabb & Daniel K.N. Johnson, Fueling Innovation: The Impact of Oil Prices and 
CAFÉ Standards on Energy-Efficient Automotive Technology, 31 ENERGY J. 199 (2010). 
60 See Burak Sen, Mehdi Noori & Omer Tatari, Will Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
Standard Help? Modeling CAFE's Impact on Market Share of Electric Vehicles, 109 ENERGY 
POL’Y 279, 279 (2017) (finding that “[t]his resulting improvement in vehicle fuel economy is like-
ly to influence consumers’ decisions regarding new vehicle purchases, while the stringent CAFE 
standards are also likely to affect manufacturers’ production costs and benefits. In addition, the 
government provides various incentives to support the adoption of alternative fuel vehicles 
(AFVs), including electric vehicles (EVs), which in turn will likewise influences consumers’ deci-
sions regarding purchasing a new vehicle.”). 
61 Michael Porter, America’s Green Strategy, 264 SCI. AM. 168 (1991). The success of the hy-
pothesis depends significantly on the context. For empirical support of the hypothesis, see, for 
example, Antoine Dechezleprêtre & Misato Sato, The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on 
Competitiveness, 11 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 183 (2017); Shunsuke Managi et. al., Envi-
ronmental Regulations and Technological Change in the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Re-
thinking the Porter Hypothesis, 81 LAND ECON. 303 (2005); and Yana Rubashkina, Marzio 
Galeotti, & Elena Verdolini, Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness: Empirical Evi-
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open up new innovation paths, is strongly supported.62 Gains in fuel effi-
ciency motivated by the CAFÉ rules are one example of such regulation-
driven innovation.63 The development of the electric car industry is an-
other. Electric cars are becoming increasingly popular, even in the face of 
low gas prices, partly due to regulation at the federal level and in the nine 
states that have adopted zero-emission plans.64  
When a regulation’s expected impact on the social value of future 
innovation can be predicted and assessed, that impact should be consid-
ered in deciding whether and how to regulate.65 But innovation is path 
dependent, unpredictable, and cumulative,66 so one might worry that rea-
lignments of demand that seem like a good idea now might turn out to be 
bad in the long run. Should one refrain from regulation out of fear of de-
terring innovations that appear to have low social value now, but would 
lead to unexpectedly high social value in the future? 
Firstly, a regulation’s potential for suppressing high social value in-
novation in the long run must always be weighed against the long-term 
social costs of the unregulated demand portfolio’s misalignment with so-
cial value. Secondly, some of our current uncertainty about the ultimate 
social value of pursuing particular innovative paths arises from the risk of 
failure. As Liskow and Karpilov have argued, that risk itself is path de-
pendent in a way that increases the benefit of regulation that realigns in-
novative activity with social preferences.67 Thirdly, if the argument is that 
innovation is truly unpredictable and serendipitous, so that its long-term 
social value cannot be usefully assessed as part of our evaluation of regu-
latory design,68 then the argument proves too much. Who, then, can say 
whether the unregulated or regulated demand portfolio will elicit the 
most socially beneficial innovation in the long run? 
So far, we have focused on well-designed regulation. In regulation, 
as in many areas of life, however, there is the realistic chance that regula-
tion will not achieve its intended goal. A regulatory process can fail in 
                                                                                                             
dence on the Porter Hypothesis from European Manufacturing Sectors, 83 ENERGY POL’Y 288 
(2015). 
62 See Ambec et al. supra note 17, at 9-10. 
63 See, e.g., Crabb & Johnson, supra note 59. 
64 Farhad Manjoo, Trump Says Regulations Impede. Perhaps Not in the Electric Car Business, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/technology/electric-car-
regulations-trump.html [https://perma.cc/EHZ8-BAHV]. 
65 For many, the approach of choice is some version of cost-benefit analysis. Cf. Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Here, we remain intentionally agnostic as to the best 
approach to evaluating whether a particular regulation will realign demand signals in a socially 
beneficial way. The point is simply that the possible long-term social value of an innovative ac-
tivity should be included in the evaluation of regulatory design to the extent it is possible to do 
so. 
66 This is what Liscow and Karpilow have termed “Innovation Snowballing.” Liscow & Karpilow, 
supra note 31. 
67 Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 31. 
68 One way to view this distinction is through the lens of “risk” versus “uncertainty.” See FRANK 
H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
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many ways: by being “captured” by improper influences,69 by incorrectly 
identifying failures of perceived demand, by inaccurately assessing and 
predicting the costs and benefits of a given regulatory design, by not con-
sidering the best design, and more. Sometimes the benefits of even the 
best practical regulatory design for addressing a particular failure may be 
outweighed by its costs. Vulnerabilities in regulatory processes exist not-
withstanding the strength of the underlying justification for regulation, 
and the choices of regulatory design have been a source of long scholarly 
debates in virtually all regulatory arenas.  
Badly designed regulation could unintentionally shift demand signals 
in socially undesirable directions. If that happens, it might be sensible to 
speak of “stifling” innovation, even if the shift simply redirects innovative 
activity. While this is a real concern, the mere possibility of error cannot 
mean that demand signals should be unregulated, especially when these 
signals are significantly misaligned with social values. 
2. Reduction in Total Innovative Activity 
The contention that regulation will stifle innovation is most naturally 
understood to mean that regulation causes the total amount of innovative 
activity to decrease. Measuring, or even defining, the amount of innova-
tion that is occurring, much less how any such amount of innovation is af-
fected by regulation, is notoriously difficult, both conceptually and empir-
ically.70 Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, we proceed under the 
presumption that some meaningful metric for the total amount of innova-
tion can be established. We first consider whether and how well-designed 
regulation could decrease total innovation and then discuss how the po-
tential for regulatory design error affects the picture.  
A regulation that is well-designed to align the demand portfolio 
closer to actual individual and social preferences might result in less in-
novation overall by some metrics. The socially preferable demand portfo-
lio, for example, might be less geared toward innovative activity. Against 
the backdrop of widespread belief that innovation is socially beneficial, 
this is an unlikely result of a well-designed regulation. However, innova-
tion is not the only value we care about. It is possible for an unregulated 
demand portfolio to incentivize too much innovative activity at the ex-
                                               
69 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory 
Capture, and Corporate Self Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995). 
70 Scholarly attempts to empirically test the relationship between regulation and innovation in-
clude, Crabb & Johnson, supra note 59; Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innova-
tion, 12 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 65, 84–86 (2012); Nathan Goldschlag & Alex Tabarrok, Is 
Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepreneurship? 33 ECON. POL’Y 5 (2018); 
Managi et. al., supra note 61. None to date has conclusively showed that regulation has generat-
ed innovation-stifling effects.  
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pense of other social values.71 In these situations, well-designed regula-
tions would reduce the total amount of innovation. As such, it may be un-
reasonable to characterize the regulation as stifling.  
Another global argument for why regulation will stifle innovation is 
that regulatory compliance and transaction costs will reduce the resources 
available for innovation.72 Regulatory compliance undoubtedly creates 
transaction costs, which in general are wasteful and can decrease the total 
resources available in society.73 Well-designed regulation could minimize 
such costs and take them into account in deciding whether the regulatory 
effort is economically justifiable. But, in any event, compliance costs, 
whether or not minimized through regulatory design, will not necessarily 
reduce investments in innovative activity even in the regulated sector, 
much less overall. Reduced innovative activity in the regulated sector is 
likely to occur only when compliance costs are (i) imposed on the regu-
lated sector but not spread throughout society, and (ii) targeted so as to 
make innovation in that sector less attractive to investors. 
Whether compliance costs are borne by the regulated sector is a 
matter of regulatory design. Compliance costs commonly are borne by 
regulated entities74–sometimes for convenience and sometimes as a regu-
latory tool–but can, in principle, be spread broadly throughout society us-
ing various mechanisms such as tax rebates. Some compliance costs, such 
as the costs of paperwork, training, monitoring, and reporting, are borne 
by regulated entities, but do not rise in proportion to their innovative ac-
tivity. General increases in the cost of doing business might, but need not, 
reduce the budget for innovative activity. To the extent that a particular 
innovative activity remains a good business proposition, investors will 
support it.  
Even when compliance costs make innovative activity in a regulated 
sector less attractive, there is no particular reason to anticipate that there 
will be less innovation overall, since investments can be shifted from one 
sector to another and net innovation will remain the same. Oftentimes, 
that is the intended purpose of the regulation. Regulation can, of course, 
also motivate innovations aimed at reducing compliance and transaction 
                                               
71 The question of whether “overall” innovation is reduced depends, of course, on the metric one 
uses. One possible sense in which well-designed regulation might reduce overall innovation 
might be to shift demand away from relatively “easy” (and thus immediately productive) innova-
tive paths with low-hanging fruit toward more socially valuable, but more difficult and thus less 
productive in the short term, paths.  
72 See, e.g., G. William Schwert & Paul J. Seguin, Securities Transaction Taxes: An Overview of 
Costs, Benefits and Unresolved Questions, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 32 (1993). 
73 See Frank A.G. den Butter, Marc de Graaf & André Nijsen, The Transaction Costs Perspec-
tive on Costs and Benefits of Government Regulation: Extending the Standard Cost Model 2 
(Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper No. 09-013/3, 2009), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1345789. 
74 See Wim Marneffe & Lode Vereeck, The Meaning of Regulatory Costs, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 
341, 350 (2011). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin Vol. 38:1 2020 
22 
costs.75 Thus, only a subset of compliance costs are likely to depress inno-
vative activity in a regulated sector: those that are (i) imposed on innova-
tors in proportion to their innovative activity, (ii) unavoidable through 
compliance-related innovation, and (iii) not recoupable via first-mover 
advantages or intellectual property. With the exception of pharmaceutical 
regulation,76 intellectual property doctrine is not generally designed with 
compliance costs in mind. As a result, regulations that create these sorts 
of compliance cost might–on average and depending on how large the 
costs are–depress overall innovative activity in a regulated sector. 
In sum, the above analysis, though highly stylized, rebuts the sweep-
ing contention that “regulation” will “stifle” innovation either through its 
direct effects on market demand signals or by imposing compliance costs. 
A regulation’s likely effects on innovation depend on its details and over-
all stifling seems like a fairly peripheral concern. Claims about regulation-
induced stifling also fail to consider the stifling effects of non-regulation 
in a market that is infested with various failures. Indeed, generalized 
handwringing about regulation’s innovation-stifling effects shifts atten-
tion away from more specific and important questions regarding regula-
tory design and the re-direction of innovative activity towards more so-
cially desirable outcomes. 
V. The Interplay Between “Failures of Appropriability” and 
Realignment of Demand 
We now turn to the possible interplay between regulation’s realign-
ment of demand and “failures of appropriability.” As we have empha-
sized, the market’s portfolio of innovative activity reflects the combina-
tion of demand signals with appropriability expectations. By realigning 
demand signals, regulation necessarily shifts the way that demand inter-
acts with appropriability to induce the portfolio of innovation that the 
market ultimately produces. In essence, the regulated and unregulated 
demand portfolios draw innovators’ attention to different parts of the ap-
propriability landscape, which can either (i) increase or diminish the 
regulation’s expected social benefits or (ii) leave them unchanged. At the 
extreme, even a regulation that realigns demand signals perfectly with so-
cial preferences could combine with an unfavorable appropriability ter-
rain to induce a portfolio of market innovation that is worse from a social 
perspective.  
                                               
75 Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, & Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy of Regulato-
ry Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 309-10 (2000). 
76 The influence of pharmaceutical regulatory costs on patent law is both explicit, see, for exam-
ple, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in title 21 of the U.S.C.) and, argu-
ably, implicit in the way that various general doctrines are interpreted in that arena. 
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One could argue that regulatory design should routinely try to take 
specific account of such variations in the appropriability terrain. This, 
however, seems like a fools’ errand in the run-of-the-mill case. When var-
iations in the appropriability landscape are small and distributed reason-
ably uniformly, the parts of the appropriability landscape highlighted by 
regulated and unregulated demand portfolios are likely to be similarly 
over and under-compensatory. As discussed above, we ordinarily rely on 
intellectual property doctrine to smooth out the appropriability landscape 
in just this way.77 Because intellectual property doctrine has developed to 
balance the costs of intellectual property protection with the benefits of 
smoothing out the appropriability terrain, intellectual property law seems 
to be an appropriate place to focus general debates about whether closer 
tailoring is appropriate. As a result, regulatory design, in theory and in 
practice, often proceeds without paying much attention to “failures of 
appropriability.” 
Moreover, there is ordinarily no reason to expect that regulation will 
change the market’s overall balance of over and under-compensation in 
any systematic or significant way. In most contexts, intellectual property 
will be roughly equally effective (or flawed) for both regulated and un-
regulated demand portfolios. This is especially likely when regulated and 
unregulated innovation are of the same technological ilk, as is often the 
case. Consider, for example, regulations requiring child-resistant packag-
ing for medications and household chemicals. Those regulations surely 
shift demand for innovation away from easy-opening packaging and to-
ward child-resistant packaging.78 Similarly, environmental regulation 
shifts demand away from gas guzzlers and toward fuel-efficient vehicles.79 
Presumptively, easy-opening and child-resistant packaging innovations 
                                               
77 Competition law arguably has a similar role with respect to barriers to entry, though this is an 
area of contention. See, e.g., Jay Modrall, A Closer Look at Competition Law and Data, 
COMPETITION L. INT’L 5-6 (2017) (“According to the Franco/German Study, in markets for 
which access to a large volume or variety of data is important, the need for such data may result 
in entry barriers when new entrants are unable either to collect or buy access to the same kind of 
data. . . . On the other hand, the Franco/German Study notes (in a footnote) that big data can 
also reduce entry barriers, for instance when data can be used by new entrants to identify and 
satisfy consumer needs.”); see also, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big 
Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 342 (2017); David L. White, Shaping Antitrust Enforcement: Great-
er Emphasis on Barriers to Entry, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 842, 850 (1989) (“[E]ntry barriers are 
only one of many factors accepted by the courts in demonstration of attempted monopolization. 
. . . [A]ntitrust principles are most sensibly constructed when promoting conditions favorable to 
easy entry and exit”). To the extent that competition law succeeds in removing barriers to entry, 
this point also applies to it. 
78 See, e.g., Vikas Pareek & Alok Khunteta, Pharmaceutical Packaging: Current Trends and Fu-
ture, 6 INT’L J. OF PHARMACY AND PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 480, 482 (2014) (explaining certain 
innovations in child-resistant packaging, which is an “essential criterion” for the success of po-
tent drugs). 
79 See Rebecca Bellan, The Grim State of Electric Vehicle Adoption in the U.S., CITYLAB (Oct. 
15, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/10/where-americas-charge-towards-
electric-vehicles-stands-today/572857 [https://perma.cc/WLK4-DMQ8] (explaining how Califor-
nia’s relatively aggressive environmental regulations have made electric vehicle adoption the 
highest out of any state). 
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are similarly protectable with intellectual property, as are gas guzzling 
and fuel-efficient innovations. Any differences between the relevant ap-
propriability landscapes are unlikely to be any more severe or systematic 
than the differences in appropriability that we routinely tolerate under 
intellectual property doctrine. Another example is R&D tax credits,80 
which stimulate innovative activity by reducing its cost, but do not affect 
the appropriability of returns from successful R&D, which is determined 
by standard intellectual property doctrine. In these contexts, it thus 
makes perfect sense for regulators to leave appropriability concerns to 
intellectual property and, to some extent, competition law. In fact, that is 
the standard practice. 
In some regulatory contexts, however, demand shifts are correlated 
significantly with appropriability failures, undercutting the separability 
assumption. Such correlations can have either positive (in the sense that 
aligning demand signals with social value systematically mitigates appro-
priability failure) or negative (in the sense that aligning demand signals 
with social value systematically exacerbates appropriability failure) ef-
fects on the overall social value of market innovation.  
Traditional network effects, such as those associated with telephone 
networks, simultaneously create value for consumers and barriers to en-
try that deter competitive or follow-on innovation and can lock consum-
ers into less preferable technologies.81 One way to mitigate appropriabil-
ity failures in such contexts is to break up networks. However, breaking 
up networks would simultaneously reduce the networks’ value to con-
sumers. When there is this sort of negative correlation, regulatory design 
should account for tradeoffs between appropriability and demand. In 
fact, regulatory design in arenas characterized by strong network effects 
commonly attempts to take these tradeoffs into account explicitly, pre-
serving network benefits for consumers as much as possible, while de-
creasing barriers to competitive and follow-on innovation.82 Regulatory 
                                               
80 See Nicholas Bloom, Rachel Griffith & John van Reenen, Do R&D Tax Credits Work? Evi-
dence from a Panel of Countries 1979–1997, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2008). 
81 See, e.g., Sean Howell, Big Data and Monopolization 4 (2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123976 (“[D]ata-driven markets tend to 
feature strong network effects and economies of scale, which create barriers to entry that other 
firms may have a hard time overcoming.”); Jens Prufer & Christoph Schottmuller, Competing 
with Big Data 2, 15 (2017) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2918726; Joseph Farrell, Coordination and 
Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG. 
1967, 2034 (2007) (“[E]arly choices are powerful, able either to help coordination or to wield 
disproportionate influence. Thus any early lead in adoptions (whether strategic or accidental) 
will tend to expand rather than to dissipate. Network markets are ‘tippy’: early instability and 
later lock-in.”). 
82 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, Antitrust Issues in Network Industries, in THE REFORM OF 
EC COMPETITION LAW 343, 367 (Ioannis Kokkoris & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2009) (explaining the 
U.S. government and European regulators’ attempts to maintain competitiveness in the tele-
communications industry without destroying the positive externalities from network effects). 
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approaches of this sort include technological standards, interconnection 
requirements, and so forth. 
Correlation between demand and appropriability can also produce 
socially desirable side effects. For example, an environmental regulation 
aimed at encouraging the use of alternative energy sources might increase 
market demand for solar panels and decrease demand for electricity pro-
duced by coal plants. Though the direct effects of this shift in demand 
may have been the regulation’s only intended effect, its ultimate impact 
would also reflect systematic differences in the extent to which solar pan-
el innovation and coal plant innovation are susceptible to appropriability 
failures. Thus, if supplying electricity over power lines from power plants 
creates barriers to entry, but supplying electricity using solar panels does 
not, electricity markets might become less infected with appropriability 
failures once the regulation is in place. 
Another example from the broadcast media context discussed earlier 
illustrates how correlations between demand and appropriability can 
produce either positive or negative side effects, depending on contextual 
specifics and regulatory details. As discussed above, the advertising-
supported business model was created at least partly in response to gaps 
in intellectual property law’s response to customer free-rider problems. 
While this business model addresses these free-rider problems, it simul-
taneously creates misalignment between market demand for program-
ming content and social preferences. Suppose that a regulation is de-
signed to realign broadcast programming content more closely with 
individual and social preferences by creating barriers to advertiser influ-
ence on content. The realigned demand portfolio will presumably be less 
favorable to advertisers, thus offering smaller returns on investment in 
content creation. The market’s ultimate production of broadcast pro-
gramming will reflect both the intended demand realignment and this ap-
propriability side effect. The overall result of the regulation could be ei-
ther socially salutary or socially detrimental. If the unregulated 
advertising-based business model tends to overcompensate content crea-
tors for their upfront costs, the regulation might simultaneously improve 
the market’s satisfaction of consumer and social preferences and mitigate 
appropriability failures–a win-win result. But if the regulation reduces 
advertising revenue so much that investments in creating socially desira-
ble content would be under-compensated, the result would be an overall 
social loss. The result might also be somewhere in between, with the 
overall evaluation of the regulation dependent on whether the ad-
vantages of better alignment with social preferences outweigh the loss of 
investment in creating socially valuable content. The crucial point is that 
when correlations between demand and appropriability materialize, one 
cannot presume separability. 
It is also possible, as discussed above, that regulatory compliance 
costs are correlated with the intensity of innovative activity. When that is 
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the case, regulation effectively raises the upfront cost of innovation, po-
tentially upsetting intellectual property’s effectiveness in smoothing out 
the appropriability landscape. Pharmaceutical regulation arguably impos-
es this sort of compliance costs.83 The studies required to meet FDA safe-
ty and efficacy standards create high compliance costs that are (i) tacked 
on to the upfront costs of drug innovation and (ii) not accounted for by 
intellectual property doctrine.84 In response to this concern, Congress en-
acted a complex array of regulatory “fixes,” including, a period of “data 
exclusivity.”85 During the data exclusivity period, innovators have an ex-
clusive right to rely on the safety and efficacy data they have submitted to 
the FDA, preventing generic companies from freeriding on it.86 Pharma-
ceutical regulation is probably unusual in having such large innovator-
specific compliance costs and there are debates about whether patent ex-
clusivity truly fails to cover pharmaceutical companies’ investments.87 
Again, this discussion is simply to illustrate the kinds of situations in 
which regulatory design and evaluation should take account of appropri-
ability effects. 
VI. Conclusion 
The market’s portfolio of innovative activity reflects suppliers’ per-
ceptions of market demand mixed with their expectations of appropria-
bility. Regulation’s traditional goal is to bring market demand into better 
alignment with individual and social preferences and values, while intel-
lectual property law (and, at times, competition law) aims to bring suppli-
ers’ incentives into line with those preferences by smoothing out the ap-
propriability landscape. In many contexts, these tasks are mostly 
separable. Regulatory design need not pay much attention to appropria-
bility, while intellectual property doctrine assumes that market demand 
correctly reflects consumer preferences.  
                                               
83 See Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas De Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: 
Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2009) (arguing that “recent regulatory 
efforts designed to encourage the development of new and innovative drugs through the provi-
sion of strong patent and "linkage" rights, which legally tie drug patenting and drug approval, 
have in fact had the opposite effect.”); see also Lacy G. Thomas, Regulation and Firm Size: FDA 
Impacts on Innovation, 21 RAND J. ECON. 497 (1990). 
84 See Thomas, supra note 83, at 501 (finding that FDA enforcement of premarket testing signifi-
cantly hurt both firms producing generic or imitative products and small firms, whereas large 
firms had the resources to work with the "super-experts" who would conduct the required stud-
ies by the FDA). 
85 See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 947 (2011). 
86 Id. 
87 See Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: 
FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 97 
(2010) (“There is an ongoing debate as to whether such FDA exclusivity is a necessary mecha-
nism to prevent erosion of incentives.”). 
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As our analysis points out, however, this implicit assumption of sep-
arability is not always valid. Under some circumstances, correlations be-
tween preferences and appropriability failures demand attention to ap-
propriability concerns as part of the regulatory design process. Viewing 
regulatory design and innovation policy through the prism of perceived 
demand and appropriability failures is not only essential in making the 
current oversimplified regulation-innovation debate more nuanced, but 
also offers a useful and comprehensive theory to evaluate the impact of 
regulation on innovation in broader, yet more contextual, terms. 
